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Abstract
Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally
different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the
same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However,
strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple
two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify
contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new
examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design
applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.
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1. Introduction
A contest is a game in which players expend costly resources, such as effort, money or
time, in order to win a prize. Since the seminal papers of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen
(1981), many different contests have been introduced to the literature. For example, Skaperdas
(1992) studies contests where the final payoff depends on the residual resources and the prize.
Chung (1996) and Kaplan et al. (2002) examine contests with effort-dependent prizes. Lee and
Kang (1998) and Baye et al. (2005) study contests with rank-order spillovers. Although these
contests are intuitively and structurally very different, they often share common links.
There are several studies that establish common links between different contests. For
example, Che and Gale (2000) provide a link between a rank-order tournament of Lazear and
Rosen (1981) and an all-pay auction of Hillman and Riley (1989). Baye et al. (2012) show the
connection between the all-pay auction and pricing games (Varian, 1980; Rosenthal, 1980).
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) show how an R&D race between two players which is modeled as a
rank-order tournament is equivalent to a rent-seeking contest.1 Baye and Hoppe (2003) identify
conditions under which research tournament models (Fullerton and McAfee, 1999) and patent
race models (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980) are strategically equivalent to the rent-seeking contest.
These duality results permit one to apply results derived in the rent-seeking contest literature to
the innovation, patent race, and rank-order tournament models, and vice versa.
In this paper we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be
strategically and effort equivalent. We consider a two-player Tullock-type contest, where
outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival.
1

Jia (2008) extends the result by proving a more general equivalence between a rank-order tournament and a rentseeking contest. Fu and Lu (2012) shows that the rent-seeking contest can further include auctions with preinvestment (Tan, 1992). Similarly, Cason et al. (2012) links the rent-seeking contest to a proportional-prize contest.
Chowdhury (2009) demonstrates the connection between all-pay auctions (Siegel, 2009) and capacity-constrained
price contests (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986; Deneckere and Kovenock, 1996).

2

Under this structure, we identify strategically equivalent contests that generate the same best
response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, the strategically
equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs.
It is important to emphasize that the aforementioned studies establish links between
different families of contests, such as all-pay auctions, rent-seeking contests, and rank-order
tournaments. The main result of this paper is conceptually different from the findings of the
previous studies. In particular, we show that even within the same family of Tullock-type
contests, different kinds of contests might produce the same best response functions and the
same equilibrium efforts (although not necessarily the same payoffs).
Tullock (1980) introduced a contest model in which resources expended by a player
improves the probability of winning the contest, but can never make the winning probability
certain. These types of contests are characterized with high volume of noise in the outcome.
Rent-seeking, legal disputes and sports competitions are often modeled using the Tullock contest
model. In a simple two-player lottery Tullock contest, the best response curves are inverted Ushaped, implying that best responses are first strategic complements and then strategic substitute.
It is also the case that a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, in which each player
expends a quarter of the prize.
Since the seminal work by Tullock, numerous studies modified the original model to
incorporate various structural and policy related issues such as tax/subsidy (Glazer and Konrad,
1999), endogenous prize (Chung, 1996; Amegashie, 1999), depreciation (Alexeev and Leitzel,
1996), spillover (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a), reimbursement (Matros and Armanios,
2009), externality (Lee and Kang, 1998), liability structure (Skaperdas and Gan, 1995), litigation
issues (Farmer and Pecorino, 1999) – to name a few (see Konrad, 2009 for an extensive review).
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Although these models use the same framework of the Tullock contest, the final outcomes are
often very different. To the best of our knowledge, no study tried to examine possible
equivalence among the aforementioned models.
Introducing equivalence among Tullock type contests is important for a number of
reasons. First, there exists a substantial literature modeling the rules of the contest as an
endogenous choice of a contest designer (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998; Epstein and Nitzan, 2006;
Corchón and Dahm, 2011; Polishchuk and Tonis, 2013). A contest designer can choose the
parameters of the model to maximize the total rent dissipation (as in the case of rent-seeking), or
maximize the equilibrium highest effort (as in R&D races), or minimize the total equilibrium
effort (as in electoral races), or simply to enhance public welfare. Our results demonstrate that it
is possible for a contest designer to achieve different goals using strategically equivalent contests.
For example, the contest designer seeking Pareto improvement may choose a contest that
generates the same equilibrium efforts, incurs the same costs, but results in higher expected
payoffs for contestants. We show, in subsequent sections, that indeed such opportunity may exist.
Under certain conditions, for example, a contest designer may prefer to implement a limited
liability contest (Skaperdas and Gan, 1995) than a contest that imposes full liability on
contestants. Finally, certain contests may be not feasible (or too costly) to implement in the field
due to regulatory restrictions and the possibility of collusion among contestants. However, such
restrictions may not necessarily apply to other strategically equivalent contests. We show, for
example, that a contest with endogenous valuation (Amegashie, 1999) that may be hard to
regulate, is equivalent to a contest with a simple taxation rule (Glazer and Konrad, 1999).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model;
Section 3 specifies the definitions of equivalence and provides with the conditions to achieve

4

them. Section 4 describes contests from literature that are strategically equivalent to the original
Tullock contest, as well as introduces a set of modified Tullock type contests that are
strategically equivalent to each other. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Model
Following Baye et al. (2005, 2012) and Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a, 2011b), we
consider a two-player contest with two prizes. The players, denoted by 𝑖 and 𝑗, value the winning
and the losing prizes as 𝑊 > 0 and 𝐿 ∈ ℝ , with 𝑊 > 𝐿 . Players simultaneously and
independently expend efforts 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0. The probability of player 𝑖 winning the contest
is defined by a lottery contest success function (Tullock, 1980):
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑥𝑖 /(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 )
1/2

if 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 ≠ 0
if 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0

(1)

Contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff for player 𝑖 is a linear function of prizes,
own effort, and the effort of the rival:
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑊 + 𝛼1 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑗
𝐿 + 𝛼2 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑥𝑗

with probability
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )

(2)

where 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 are cost parameters ( 𝛼1 < 0 , 𝛼2 ≤ 0 ), and 𝛽1 ∈ ℝ , 𝛽2 ∈ ℝ are spillover
parameters. We define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω) , where Ω =
{𝑊, 𝐿, 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 } is a set of parameters. All parameters in Ω and the contest success function
are common knowledge. Players are risk neutral, therefore the expected payoff for player 𝑖 is
𝑥

𝑥

𝑗
𝑖
𝐸(𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )) = 𝑥 +𝑥
(𝑊 + 𝛼1 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑗 ) + 𝑥 +𝑥
(𝐿 + 𝛼2 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑥𝑗 )
𝑖

𝑗

𝑖
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𝑗

(3)

where (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) ≠ (0,0). For 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0, the expected payoff is 𝐸(𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )) = (𝑊 + 𝐿)/2.2
Player 𝑖’s best response is derived by maximizing 𝐸(𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )) with respect to 𝑥𝑖 :
𝑥𝑖𝐵𝑅𝐹

{(𝛼1 −𝛼2 )−(𝛽1 −𝛽2 )}𝑥𝑗2 −{𝑊−𝐿}𝑥𝑗

= {−𝑥𝑗 + √

𝛼1

0

𝑊−𝐿
1 −𝛼2 )−(𝛽1 −𝛽2 )}

if 𝑥𝑗 ≤ {(𝛼

(4)

otherwise

Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) show that although the payoff function (3) is not
globally concave, the first order condition and the resulting best response function (4) are
sufficient for an equilibrium to exist. The restriction needed for the best response function to be
𝑊−𝐿

well defined, i.e., 𝑥𝑗 ≤ {(𝛼

, is weaker than the condition needed for the payoff

1 −𝛼2 )−(𝛽1 −𝛽2 )}

function to be concave in the relevant region and as a result, when the best response is positive
then solving the best response functions will give us an equilibrium. Moreover, under the
appropriate restrictions, i.e., (𝛽2 − 𝛼1 ) ≥ 0 and −(3𝛼1 + 𝛼2 ) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2 ) > 0, there is a unique
symmetric equilibrium defined by:
𝑥𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑗∗ = 𝑥 = −(3𝛼

(𝑊−𝐿)

.

(5)

1 +𝛼2 )−(𝛽1 −𝛽2 )

Given the symmetric equilibrium (5), the equilibrium payoff is
(𝛽 −𝛼 )(𝑊−𝐿)

𝐸 ∗ (𝜋) = −(3𝛼 2+𝛼 1)−(𝛽
1

2

1 −𝛽2 )

+ 𝐿.

(6)

The contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω), defined by (1) and (2), may also generate asymmetric equilibria.3
Since in the current study we focus only on the symmetric equilibrium, we impose further

2

Risk neutrality is crucial, as elaborated in the discussion section, for closed form solutions and results of this
analysis. If the players are not risk neutral, then it is possible that players exert different effort in equilibrium (than
the one derived under risk neutrality) and there are multiple equilibria (Cornes and Hartley, 2012).
3
Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011b) show that asymmetric equilibria, in which one player exerts very high effort
and another player exerts very low effort can arise in strictly restrictive cases (such as when the marginal cost of
losing the contest is substantially higher than the marginal cost of winning the contest). In this study we focus on the
more general case of symmetric equilibrium that allows for cleaner algebra, while not compromising on basic
intuitions.
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restriction (5𝛼1 − 𝛼2 ) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2 ) > 0 , derived by Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011b), to
guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium.

3. Equivalent Contests
In this section, we define strategically equivalent contests and show the required
parametric restrictions to obtain the equivalence. We start by providing a definition of strategic
equivalence.
Definition 1: Contests are strategically equivalent if they generate the same best response
functions.
This definition of strategic equivalence comes directly from Morris and Ui (2004) who
provide a general characterization of best-response equivalent games. It is, however, different
from the definition used in Baye and Hoppe (2003) in which games are strategically equivalent
when they generate the same expected payoff functions, and thus the same equilibrium payoffs.
Here, we use a less restrictive definition of strategic equivalence, namely the best response
equivalence. It is usually the case in the contest design literature that a contest designer chooses
the rules of the contest to induce a specific behavior of contestants (Dasgupta and Nti, 1998;
Epstein and Nitzan, 2006) while being indifferent towards the resulting payoffs of contestants.
Thus, it seems appropriate to have a less restrictive definition of strategic equivalence that
mainly relates to strategic behavior of contestants and not their payoffs.4
To demonstrate strategic equivalence, let us now consider two contests Γ 𝐴 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω 𝐴 ) and
Γ 𝐵 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵 ), where Ω𝑘 = {𝑊 𝑘 , 𝐿𝑘 , 𝛼1𝑘 , 𝛼2𝑘 , 𝛽1𝑘 , 𝛽2𝑘 } for 𝑘 = 𝐴, 𝐵. From equation (4), the necessary

4

However, in many cases (e.g. for welfare and/or fairness purposes) a contest designer does care about the resulting
payoffs of contestants. Therefore, using only the strict definition of strategic equivalence is not without costs, and
one may use a more restrictive definition of strategic equivalence that also requires the equivalence of payoffs (see
Definition 3).
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and sufficient condition for contests Γ 𝐴 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω 𝐴 ) and Γ 𝐵 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵 ) to be strategically equivalent,
i.e., to have the same best response functions, is the following:
(𝛼1𝐴 −𝛼2𝐴 )−(𝛽1𝐴 −𝛽2𝐴 )
𝛼1𝐴

=

(𝛼1𝐵 −𝛼2𝐵 )−(𝛽1𝐵 −𝛽2𝐵 )
𝛼1𝐵

and

(𝑊 𝐴 −𝐿𝐴 )
𝛼1𝐴

=

(𝑊 𝐵 −𝐿𝐵 )
𝛼1𝐵

.

(7)

Intuitively, (7) describes the conditions for which the two best response functions become
the same. The second condition of (7) essentially shows that the winning to losing prize
difference, scaled by the winning marginal cost, needs to be the same. Whereas the first
condition shows that the winning to losing marginal cost versus spillover (again scaled by the
winning marginal cost) should be the same for the two strategically equivalent contests. Hence, it
may be possible that both the marginal costs as well as the spillover values in one contest are
higher than the same in another contest, but still the two contests are strategically equivalent. It
also reiterates the fact that only the winning and losing prize value differences, and not the
absolute valuations, matter.
Next, we define effort equivalent contests.
Definition 2: Contests are effort equivalent if they result in the same equilibrium efforts.
From equation (5), the necessary and sufficient condition for contests Γ 𝐴 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω 𝐴 ) and
Γ 𝐵 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵 ) to be effort equivalent is the following:
(𝑊 𝐴 −𝐿𝐴 )
−(3𝛼1𝐴 +𝛼2𝐴 )−(𝛽1𝐴 −𝛽2𝐴 )

(𝑊 𝐵 −𝐿𝐵 )

= −(3𝛼𝐵 +𝛼𝐵 )−(𝛽𝐵 −𝛽𝐵 ).
1

2

1

2

(8)

Intuitively, (8) shows that the winning and losing prize value differences scaled by
winning to losing marginal cost versus spillover parameters need to be the same for the two
contests to produce the same equilibrium effort.
Generally, strategic equivalence (Definition 1) is a stronger condition than effort
equivalence (Definition 2) because it requires different contests to generate exactly the same best
response functions, and as a consequence the same equilibrium efforts. However, given that in
8

our analysis we impose restrictions to guarantee that only the unique and symmetric equilibrium
(5) exists, strategic equivalence implies effort equivalence.5 It is also important to emphasize that
without spillovers, effort equivalence is the same as the revenue equivalence, since revenue of a
contest designer is simply the sum of all individual efforts (Baron and Myerson, 1982;
Moldovanu and Sela, 2001).6
In addition to strategic and effort equivalence, we also define payoff equivalent contests.
Definition 3: Contests are payoff equivalent if they generate the same expected payoffs.
From equation (6), the necessary and sufficient condition for contests Γ 𝐴 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω 𝐴 ) and
Γ 𝐵 (𝑖, 𝑗, Ω𝐵 ) to be payoff equivalent, i.e., to generate the same equilibrium payoffs, is the
following:
(𝛽2𝐴 −𝛼1𝐴 )(𝑊 𝐴 −𝐿𝐴 )

(𝛽 𝐵 −𝛼𝐵 )(𝑊 𝐵 −𝐿𝐵 )

+ 𝐿𝐴 = −(3𝛼2𝐵 +𝛼1𝐵 )−(𝛽𝐵 −𝛽𝐵 ) + 𝐿𝐵 .
−(3𝛼𝐴 +𝛼𝐴 )−(𝛽 𝐴 −𝛽𝐴 )
1

2

1

2

1

2

1

2

(9)

Similar to (7) and (8), the equivalence condition (9) can be interpreted as the following:
the losing prize is a certain prize, along with that there is a possibility to win the difference of the
winning and losing prize, but with an associated cost. The first component in both sides of
equation (9) shows the expected payoff and the second component is the certain losing payoff.
Understandably, the sum of the two is the same for two payoff equivalent contests.
It is easy to verify that strategic equivalence (Definition 1) does not automatically imply
payoff equivalence (Definition 3). As we show in the next section, depending on the cost and
spillover parameters in Ω, one strategically equivalent contest can generate higher payoff than
another.
5

If two contests generate exactly the same best response functions, then the best response functions also intersect at
the same point – generating the same equilibrium output.
6
In contests with spillovers there are different ways to define revenue, and thus effort equivalence may not imply
revenue equivalence. For example, revenue can be defined as the sum of individual efforts and both positive and
negative spillovers, or as the sum of efforts and only positive spillovers. Such alternative definitions of revenue
would require different conditions for revenue equivalence. In this paper, however, we focus only on effort
equivalence since eliciting individual efforts is usually the main objective of a contest designer.
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Finally, to simplify our analysis we assume that all alternative contests have the same
winning prize and the same losing prize, i.e., 𝑊 𝐴 = 𝑊 𝐵 = 𝑊 and 𝐿𝐴 = 𝐿𝐵 = 𝐿 . This
assumption is intuitive when the contest designer has specific pre-defined prizes which he can
use to design a contest.7 Given this assumption, strategic equivalence condition (7) and effort
equivalence condition (8) are simplified to the following condition:
𝛽2𝐴 − 𝛽1𝐴 − 𝛼2𝐴 = 𝛽2𝐵 − 𝛽1𝐵 − 𝛼2𝐵 and 𝛼1𝐴 = 𝛼1𝐵 .

(10)

In the rest of the paper, we follow a simple two-step procedure to find strategically
equivalent contests to a particular baseline contest. First, we derive the best response function of
the baseline contest as in equation (4). Second, from the best response function of the baseline
contest we derive the restrictions needed, as in (10), for a more general family of contests to
generate the same best response functions. This simple procedure is used throughout our
analysis.

4. Equivalent Contests
We begin with the original contest of Tullock (1980) as the baseline contest in Section
4.1, and describe contests from literature that are strategically equivalent to the Tullock contest.
In Section 4.2, we introduce a set of modified Tullock type contests that are strategically
equivalent to each other.

4.1. Original Tullock Contest
In the standard rent-seeking contest, introduced by Tullock (1980), there is no losing
prize and regardless of the outcome of the contest, both players forgo their efforts. In such a case,
7

This specification is more restrictive than when the designer has the total prize value the same for two contests
(i.e., 𝑊 𝐴 + 𝐿𝐴 = 𝑊 𝐵 + 𝐿𝐵 ), but can allocate the winning and losing prize according to the contest. However, these
two specifications converge when there is no losing prize (i.e., 𝐿𝐴 = 𝐿𝐵 = 0).
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the winning prize value 𝑊 > 0, 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = −1, and the other parameters in Ω are zero. The
payoff for player 𝑖 in case of winning or losing is
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖
−𝑥𝑖

with probability
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )

(11)

Using our notation, the Tullock contest is defined as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1,0,0}). The resulting
best response function in such a contest for player 𝑖 is
𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗 .

(12)

For a generic contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 𝐿, 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 }) to be strategically equivalent to contest
Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1,0,0}) , according to condition (10), we need to impose the following
restrictions: 𝛽2 − 𝛽1 − 𝛼2 = 1, 𝛼1 = −1 and 𝐿 = 0. Such restrictions guarantee that the best
response function (4) is exactly the same as the best response function (12). Therefore, by
definition these contests are strategically equivalent.
One particularly interesting case arises when we put further restrictions 𝛽1 = −1 and
𝛼2 = 𝛽2 = 0. In such a contest, Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1,0, −1,0}), the new payoff function is:
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗
0

with probability
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )

(13)

Note that in (13), the winner fully reimburses the loser. This can be interpreted as the ‘Marshall
system of litigation’ (Baye et al., 2005) in which the winner pays his own legal costs and also
reimburses all of the legal costs of the loser, whereas the standard Tullock contest can be
interpreted as the ‘American system of litigation’ in which each litigant pays its own legal
expenses.8 It can easily be shown that the unique equilibrium for contests defined by (11) and
(13) is the symmetric equilibrium with 𝑥𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑗∗ = 𝑊/4. Moreover, the expected payoff in both
contests is exactly the same, 𝐸 ∗ (𝜋) = 𝑊/4. Therefore, contests (11) and (13) are strategically,
8

Also see Matros and Armanios (2009) and Yates (2011) for further examples of this type of contests.
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effort and payoff equivalent. This equivalence is surprising, since the two contests are intuitively
and structurally very different. However, it has been also shown in an all-pay auction setting
under incomplete information (Baye et al., 2005). Therefore, our results provide further evidence
that Marshall and American systems of litigation are revenue (in our case, effort) and payoff
equivalent.9 Furthermore, the robustness of the result shows that the seemingly unfair Marshall
system of litigation indeed result in the same effort and payoff to litigants as the standard
American system. Hence, it may not be necessary (under the restriction of risk neutrality) for an
institution to shift from one to another system of litigation.
It is also straightforward to show that the ‘input spillover’ contest of Chowdhury and
Sheremeta (2011a) and Baye et al. (2012), where the effort expended by player j partially affects
player 𝑖 and vice versa, is strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest. The spillover
contest can be defined as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, 𝛽, 𝛽}), where 𝛽 ∈ (−1,1) is the input spillover
parameter. This type of contest is motivated by spillover effects in R&D innovation
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). From strategic equivalence condition
(10), one can see that for any value of 𝛽, the resulting best response function is exactly the same
as in (11). Hence, the input spillover contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, 𝛽, 𝛽}) is strategically
equivalent to the original Tullock contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1,0,0}). This result suggests that if
an R&D competition is modeled as a lottery contest, then the existence of symmetric spillovers
may not affect the equilibrium. However, the ‘input spillover’ contest is not payoff equivalent to
the original Tullock contest, since condition (9) is not satisfied. It can be easily shown that a

9

There are two structural differences between Baye et al. (2005) and this study. We use a Tullock CSF with
complete information, whereas Baye et al. (2005) implement an all-pay auction CSF with incomplete information.
In an all-pay auction the player with the highest effort wins the contest with certainty, whereas in the Tullock
contest, the player with the highest effort only has a higher probability of winning. Moreover, in an incomplete
information setting, players do not know about the prize valuation (and other parameters) of its rival, but know only
about the distribution, whereas in complete information setting everything is common knowledge.
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positive (negative) spillover provides a higher (lower) payoff to the players than the Tullock
contest. Hence, our analysis gives further support, from a benevolent policymaker’s point of
view, to encourage contests with positive spillover and discourage contests with negative
spillovers. Since in the R&D contests positive spillovers are often related to the Intellectual
Property Rights (IPR) issues, a designer might try to manipulate the spillover parameters such
that the positive spillovers are high enough without damaging the IPR issues.

4.2. Modified Tullock-Type Contests
Researchers often use modified versions of the original Tullock contests in order to
address specific questions such as taxes, subsidies, externalities, effort dependent valuations, cost
differences, etc. There are instances in the literature where two different Tullock-type contests
are strategically equivalent to each other. Here we briefly discuss some of these examples.
Chung (1996) assumes that the value of the winning prize depends on the total effort
expenditures in the contest. A simple linear version of the Chung (1996) model would generate
the following payoff function:
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑊 + 𝑎(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 ) − 𝑥𝑖
− 𝑥𝑖

with probability
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )

(14)

Hence, (14) can be described as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝑎 − 1, −1, 𝑎, 0}), where 𝑎 ∈ (0,1), and the best
response function is
𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗 /(1 − 𝑎)

(15)

Lee and Kang (1998) study a contest with externalities. In their model the cost of effort
decreases with the total effort expenditures. This contest can be captured by
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 )
−𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 )

with probability
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
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(16)

Hence, (16) can be described as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝑏 − 1, 𝑏 − 1, 𝑏, 𝑏}), where 𝑏 ∈ (0,1), and the best
response function is
𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗 /(1 − 𝑏)

(17)

When 𝑎 = 𝑏 the best response functions (15) and (17) and the equilibrium effort
expenditures in the two contests are exactly the same. This result indicates that some contests
with endogenous prizes, as in Chung (1996), are strategically equivalent to contests with
externalities, as in Lee and Kang (1998). Also note that, although both contests are strategically
equivalent, they are not payoff equivalent. In particular, the contest defined by (16) results in
higher expected payoff than the contest defined by (14), providing a clear Pareto ranking
between the two contests. Hence, a benevolent contest designer, such as the government trying to
maximize the total social welfare, may opt to choose a contest that elicits the same level of
expenditures and, at the same time, results in Pareto improvement for both contestants.
Next, we consider a ‘limited liability’ contest introduced by Skaperdas and Gan (1995),
where the loser’s payoff is independent of the efforts expended. 10 The authors motivate this
example by stating that contestants may be entrepreneurs who borrow money to spend on
research and development and thus are not legally responsible in case of a loss. The loser of such
a contest is unable to repay the loan and goes bankrupt. In such a case, 𝑊 > 0, 𝛼1 = −1, and the
other parameters in Ω are zero. The payoff is:
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖
0

with probability
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )

(18)

The best response function for player 𝑖 is:
𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑥𝑗2 + 𝑊𝑥𝑗

10

(19)

Example of these kinds of contests can also be found in Matros and Armanios (2009).
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For a contest to be strategically equivalent to Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1,0,0,0}) the required
restrictions from (10) are 𝛽2 − 𝛽1 − 𝛼2 = 0 , 𝛼1 = −1 and 𝐿 = 0 . When we impose further
restrictions 𝛼2 = −1 , 𝛽2 = −1 and 𝛽1 = 0 we obtain a contest with the following payoff
function:
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ) = {

𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖
−𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗

with probability
𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )
with probability 1 − 𝑝𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 )

(20)

This contest can be interpreted as a ‘full liability’ contest, since the loser has to pay in full the
expenditures of both players. Note that although (18) is strategically equivalent to (20), the ‘full
liability’ contest is (by definition) more risky than the ‘limited liability’ contest. In (18) players
do not have to worry about what happens in the case of a loss, since they are not legally
responsible. In contrast, the loser in (20) has to pay the expenditures of both players. Therefore,
equivalence between (18) and (20) holds only under the assumption of risk neutrality. Moreover,
it is easy to verify from (9) that contests (18) and (20) are not payoff equivalent. The equilibrium
payoff in the ‘full liability’ contest is 𝐸 ∗ (𝜋) = 0 and in the ‘limited liability’ contest it is
𝐸 ∗ (𝜋) = 𝑊/3. This is another specific example in which a contest designer can step in, if he is
interested in overall payoff. Since the two contests are effort equivalent, but the limited liability
contest provides the players with a higher payoff, and presumably will need less monitoring than
the full liability contest, a contest designer may be interested to implement a limited liability
contest instead of a full liability contest.
Alexeev and Leitzel (1996) study a ‘rent-shrinking’ contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, −1,0}),
where the winning prize value decreases by the total effort expenditures. From (10), a
strategically equivalent contest would require 𝛽2 − 𝛽1 − 𝛼2 = 2, 𝛼1 = −1 and 𝐿 = 0. A ‘lazy
winner’ contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −2,0,0}) of Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a), in which the
marginal cost of winning (𝛼1 = −1) is lower than the marginal cost of losing (𝛼2 = −2),
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definitely satisfies these restrictions. Moreover, the two contests are also payoff equivalent. The
equivalence between the ‘rent-shrinking’ and ‘lazy winner’ contests enables the designer to
achieve the same equilibrium rent dissipation using two alternative contests. Nevertheless, the
‘lazy winner’ contest is, arguably, easier to implement and it is less susceptible to the collusion
problem mentioned in Alexeev and Leitzel (1996).
In many cases a contest designer can use different policy tools to implement a certain
contest. Using the same procedure as before it can be shown that under certain restrictions,
contests with endogenous valuations (Amegashie, 1999), contests with differential cost structure
(Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2011a), and contests with taxes (Glazer and Konrad, 1999), are
strategically equivalent. Specifically, Glazer and Konrad (1999) study a contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {(1 −
𝑡)𝑤, 0, −(1 − 𝑡), −1,0,0}), in which a part of the rent seeker’s non-negative profit is taxed with
tax rate 𝑡 ∈ (0,1) . Amegashie (1999) studies a contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −(1 − 𝑚), −1,0,0}) , in
which the winner’s prize value is a linear function of own effort spent. Chowdhury and
Sheremeta (2011a) study the ‘lazy winner’ contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝛼1 , 𝛼2 , 0,0}) , in which the
marginal cost of winning is lower than the marginal cost of losing, i.e., |𝛼1 | < |𝛼2 |.
Using condition (7), when (1 − 𝑡)𝑤 = 𝑊, 𝛼1 − 𝛼2 = 𝑡 = 𝑚, and 𝛼1 = (𝑡 − 1) = (𝑚 −
1) then the three contests are strategically and effort equivalent. The first condition means that
the take-home winning payoff in the contest with tax should be the same as the basic winning
prize of the other two contests. The second condition implies that the tax rate in the tax contest
should be same as the endogenous valuation margin in the endogenous valuation contest.
Moreover, the difference between winning and losing marginal cost, which has the same effect in
the lazy winner contest, should also be the same. Finally, and most intuitively, the marginal cost
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of winning in the lazy winner contest is same as the ‘effective’ marginal costs of winning in the
other two contests.
The equivalence between these three seemingly unrelated contests conveys an important
message. It shows that the designer can either use policy tools, such as taxes, or contests with
alternative cost structure to achieve the same objective, and it may be easier to implement the
policy from one domain to another. Moreover, the three contests do not necessarily generate the
same equilibrium payoffs. The equilibrium payoff (under the restriction of strategic equivalence)
in Glazer and Konrad (1999) is 𝐸 ∗ (𝜋) = (1 − 𝑡)2 W/(4 − 3𝑡) , in Amegashie (1999) it is
𝐸 ∗ (𝜋) = (1 − 𝑡)𝑊/(4 − 3𝑡), and in Chowdhury and Sheremeta (2011a) it is 𝐸 ∗ (𝜋) = (1 −
𝑡)W/(2 − 3𝑡). Hence, a contest designer, such as a government trying to maximize the social
welfare, can achieve a Pareto improvement by choosing a specific contest structure that
generates the highest payoffs for players yet results in the same equilibrium efforts. In specific,
implementing a contest designed with endogenous valuation might be preferable to the designer
than implementing a contest with taxation.

5. Discussion
In this paper we use a two-player Tullock-type contest to show that intuitively and
structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. We define strategically equivalent
contests as contests that generate the same best response functions. Under the assumption of a
unique equilibrium, strategically equivalent contests are also effort equivalent. However,
strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs, and thus may not be
payoff equivalent. We describe a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent
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contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the
original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests.
We reestablish some existing results derived under alternative contest success functions
and incomplete information, i.e., the equivalence of the American and Marshall systems of
litigation. We also introduce new results, such as the equivalence between a standard Tullock
contest and an input spillover contest, as well as the equivalence of a number of Tullock-type
contests with endogenous valuations, spillovers, and differential cost structures.
Our findings contribute to the contest design literature by demonstrating how different
strategically equivalent contests can be used to achieve the same objectives. A contest designer
may choose to maximize the total rent dissipation, minimize equilibrium efforts, or simply
enhance public welfare. Our results demonstrate that the contest designer can achieve these
objectives by imposing appropriate restrictions on contest parameters. For example, we show
that the two strategically and effort equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs.
Hence, a contest designer seeking Pareto improvement may choose a contest that generates the
same efforts, incurs the same costs, but results in higher expected payoffs for contestants.
It is important to understand the critical conditions required for the equivalence to hold in
the field. Following the majority of the rent-seeking contests in the literature, we consider a twoplayer Tullock-type contest with linear cost and spillover structure under risk neutrality. The
strategic equivalence results may not hold if we relax one or more of these assumptions. There
are practical applications in which costs are convex (Moldovanu and Sela, 2001), spillovers
influence the payoff function in a non-linear manner (Kräkel, 2004), or players are risk averse
(Millner and Pratt, 1991; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010). A different analysis of equivalence would
be required in such cases.
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There can also be behavioral factors that may influence individual decisions but are not
modeled in the current setting. For example, it has been shown in laboratory settings that
contestants make mistakes (Sheremeta, 2011), have incorrect judgments (Parco et al., 2005;
Amaldoss and Rapoport, 2009), and exhibit non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010;
Price and Sheremeta, 2011).11 Some of these behavioral factors may distort individual behavior
in strategically equivalent contests, and thus may break such equivalence.
There are many interesting extensions that call for future research, such as player
asymmetry in terms of player specific parametric values or different winning and losing prizes in
contests. It may also be interesting to apply the equivalence ideas to contests between groups.
Nevertheless, the concept of strategic equivalence and the two-step procedure (described in
Section 3) to obtain strategically equivalent contests would be still relevant for such analyses.
Using the two-step procedure one could, for example, find equivalence conditions with more
than two players, risk aversion, and non-linear cost/spillover structure. Such analyses as well as
the empirical tests of the equivalence in the laboratory are left for future research.

11

For an extensive review of the experimental literature on contests see Dechenaux et al. (2014) and for a review of
behavioral explanations see Sheremeta (2013).
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